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The State of Collective Bargaining and 
Worker Representation in Germany: The Erosion Continues 
 
This paper investigates trends in collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany 
from 2000 to 2008. It seeks to update and widen earlier analyses pointing to a decline in 
collective bargaining, while providing more information on the dual system as a whole. Using 
data from the IAB Employment Panel and the German Employment Register, we report 
evidence of a systematic and continuing erosion of the dual system. Not unnaturally the 
decline is led by developments in western Germany. Arguably, the path of erosion will 
continue until rough and ready convergence is reached with eastern Germany. Expressed 
differently, if the process of decentralization underpinning these developments once was 
‘regulated’ it no longer appears to be so. 
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While this process of institutional erosion may take a long time, in the end, the 
German model of industrial relations will more and more lose its exclusivity and 
distinctiveness (Hassel, 1999: 503). 
 
I. Introduction   
Shrinking collective bargaining coverage in Germany is not new. Nor for that matter 
is it long standing, so much so that observers tended to equate the case of Germany 
with institutional resilience and path dependence. Among the first to identify 
quantitative changes in the twin pillars of the German dual system of industrial 
relations was Hassel (1999), who noted the falling proportion of employees covered 
by sectoral agreements and a certain weakening in works council coverage. Hassel 
(2002) subsequently reaffirmed her erosion-plus-decentralization thesis. A protean 
debate on the possibly cyclical nature of the trends pointed to by Hassel (see, for 
example, Klikauer, 2002) proved short lived as other observers were soon to chart 
decline along both these and also a number of other gradients, such as firm 
resignations from employers’ associations and sharply declining union density (see 
respectively, Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a; Silvia and Schroeder, 2007; Addison, 
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003).  
But the overall evidence on the coverage of the institutions of German 
industrial relations is now both dated and piecemeal, and there is therefore a need to 
provide updated and more comprehensive information on the extent of collective 
bargaining and works council coverage. Has the decline in sectoral bargaining 
continued or has it subsided (perhaps as a result of contractual innovations such as 
opening clauses, pacts for employment and competitiveness, and weaker forms of 
membership in employer associations)?
1  Has decentralization taken the form of a 
rising coverage of firm agreements on the Anglo-Saxon pattern? And does the course 
of representation in works councils point to a growing codetermination deficit?  
We seek answers to these broad questions using data from IAB Establishment 
Panel, 1999-2009. Specifically, we shall chart the share of firms and employees 
covered by both sectoral and firm-level collective bargaining and, crucially, the 
default of no collective bargaining. We also chart the establishment coverage of and 
worker representation in works councils. In each case, we address full cross sections 
of establishments as well as their key constituents. Specifically, in addition to the 
aggregate findings we are interested in the results for permanent stayers (i.e.  
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continuing establishments observed in every single year of the sample) newly-founded 
establishments (or births), and closing/failing establishments (deaths). 
To anticipate our findings, and as our title suggests, we conclude that the 
erosion in sectoral collective bargaining first observed in the 1990s is ongoing. 
Moreover, the decline is across the board, being observed for each of the samples 
identified here. That said, there are marked regional differences. The erosion is more 
pronounced in western Germany, and possibly represents the working out of a process 
of convergence. We even detect some erosion in codetermination, on which 
development there was no real consensus in the previous literature. Ironically, the 
decline in works council frequency detected here follows in the wake of changes in 
the enabling legislation in 2001 designed to promote works council formation (see 
Bellmann and Ellguth, 2006). Finally, there is no real suggestion of any material 
increase in firm-level collective bargaining.  
Not directly examined here are the consequences of the erosion in collective 
bargaining. (And we will take it as read that there is no real disagreement over the 
forces promoting institutional change: globalization, high unemployment, unification, 
and structural shifts in employment patterns.) Thus, investigation of the impact of 
changes in the industrial relations system on, say, wage determination and wage 
dispersion is left to a later date. To repeat, our goal is rather to set down the facts of 
the case, to provide an updated and thorough description of changes in the dual 
system and establish the status quo ante.  
 
II. Some Opening Remarks on the Erosion-Decentralization Thesis  
The German system of (relatively) centralized wage bargaining is widely recognized 
as having displayed considerable stability until the end of the 1980s, with the second 
tier of the dual system allowing German industrial relations to accommodate to a 
trend toward decentralization in that decade (Thelen, 1991). In short, sectoral 
agreements continued to dominate in Germany long after their demise in other 
regimes because of the substantial devolved labor powers of workplace 
codetermination.  
  The erosion of the German system of industrial relations since the early 1990s 
has been analyzed by Hassel (1999), who identifies a decline in the coverage of plant-
level codetermination and sectoral collective bargaining, that is, across both pillars of 
the dual system. Of the two, she argues that the decline in works council coverage has  
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been the more profound since there are collective agreements for almost all economic 
sectors.
2  But on the collective bargaining front, Hassel identifies two major 
developments: a steady increase in the number of company agreements relative to 
central (i.e. sectoral) agreements, especially in west Germany where they are less 
common than in east Germany, and the corollary of a pronounced decrease in the 
membership rates of employers’ confederations. Hassel argues that the decline in 
coverage by German industrial relations institutions as a whole has coincided with 
greater pressure towards decentralization in collective bargaining. She distinguishes 
between regulated decentralization (via opening clauses, hardship agreements, and 
company-specific agreements) where the parties have sought to pre-empt pressures to 
decentralize collective bargaining by allowing for some differentiation while avoiding 
delegating decision-making rights on wages to plant level and actual deviations from 
standard terms and conditions in some ‘pacts’ where management has opened up an 
independent or substitute collective bargaining agenda from below. But she is 
concerned to warn that regulated decentralization may be no less divisive and 
ultimately destabilizing for the system than processes of decentralization from below. 
In sum, Hassel contends that the German system is under challenge as a result of 
shrinking regulative capacity in conjunction with increasing decentralization 
pressures. 
In updating her analysis, Hassel (2002) argues that the evidence continues to 
support her erosion thesis. Drawing on survey data, she notes that between 1995 and 
1998 the plant coverage rate of sectoral agreements in west (east) Germany shrank 
from 53.4 percent (27.6 percent) 47.7 percent (25.8 percent). In terms of private sector 
employee coverage the corresponding values for west (east) Germany were 72.2 
percent and 67.8 percent (56.2 percent and 50.5 percent). She also observes a further 
decline in the membership of employer associations (strictly speaking only the case of 
Gesamtmetall is investigated) which were becoming increasingly dominated by large 
employers, and a further shift away from sectoral agreements, again indexed by an 
increase in company agreements as a share of total agreements. She further reports a 
pronounced fall in union density (from 27 percent in 1980 to 18.6 percent in 1999) 
and a sharp increase in non-unionized works councillors (up from 26.5 percent in 
1994 to 33.3 percent in 1998). 
Now there is a growing literature on the changes under way in Germany’s 
coordinated model of industrial relations (see below), but this has tended to focus  
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more on the broad theme of decentralization than on presenting a comprehensive 
review of the facts of the case in terms of the coverage of collective bargaining and 
worker representation (or drawing on them in the manner of Hassel). As a practical 
matter, information on such representation tends to be either dated or partial. Thus, we 
have rather patchy data on sectoral bargaining coverage over the course of the present 
decade. Much of the information pertains to developments between 1995 and 2001 
(Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a, 2003b). Some more recent studies that confirm the 
diminishing importance of sectoral agreements identified earlier do not range beyond 
2005 (e.g. Kohaut and Schnabel, 2007). Such treatments typically lack supportive data 
on the course of plant-level collective bargaining proper or the collective bargaining 
free zone and fail to identify parallel developments in worker representation through 
works councils.
3 Exceptions are the study by Addison et al. (2009) which covers the 
interval 1998-2004, and upon which the present treatment builds, and the ‘updates’ 
provided by Ellguth and Kohaut (2008, 2010) in which close attention is paid to the 
holes in occupational and branch coverage. In another recent treatment, Kohaut and 
Ellguth (2008) also add an interesting wrinkle in distinguishing between closing, 
continuing, and new establishments. Our treatment will introduce the latter innovation 
in presenting comprehensive information on collective bargaining coverage and 
worker representation.
4  
As noted earlier, the second and dominant strand of the German research has 
focused on the mechanics of the decentralization process. As we have seen, 
decentralization is in principle compatible with unchanged sectoral bargaining 
coverage under ‘regulated decentralization.’ Although they would certainly not 
contest the facts of changes in institutions and collective bargaining coverage noted 
earlier, perhaps the majority of observers have concluded from their examination of 
the collective bargaining process pace Hassel that the system is not destabilizing.
 
Thus, it has been argued that experience supports the idea that German employers 
have a vested interest in maintaining the dual system (e.g. Thelen and Van 
Wijnbergen, 2003) and that the system admits of powerful flexibility, allowing 
outsourcing and other adjustments to change without precipitating  conflict (e.g. 
Streeck, 2001), underscored by pervasive cooperation (Frege, 2003). For these 
observers the dual system remains intact by managing to achieve “transformation 
without disruption” (Streeck and Thelen, 2004: 4).  
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While Hassel (1999: 502) would undoubtedly agree with this diagnosis for the 
category of large manufacturing firms, she would argue that the system is unstable 
because its glue in the form plant-level codetermination is eroding while the 
emergence of a growing gap between highly regulated sectors with strong industrial 
relations institutions and poorly regulated sectors with weak institutions inevitably 
compounds conflictual relations between companies of different sizes within 
employer groups, adding to the problem of collective action on the part of these 
confederations. A similar argument has more recently been advanced by Doellgast 
and Greer (2007) in a study of outsourcing in the German telecommunications and 
auto industries. The authors argue that as core employers migrate jobs to 
subcontractors, subsidiaries, and temporary agencies they introduce new 
organizational boundaries across the production chain and disrupt traditional 
bargaining structures. The authors further contend that as a practical matter the 
response by worker representatives to re-establish representation in the new sectors 
has failed to restore coordinated bargaining. In other words, they see the system as 
fragmenting, and view decentralization as increasingly uncontrolled, at least as far the 
two sectors they examine are concerned.
5 
To a very considerable degree, debate over the ‘transformation without 
disruption’ issue has proceeded more on the basis of the performance of actual 
collective agreements rather than upon numerical decline in the institutions of 
collective bargaining and worker representation. As we have seen, the main exception 
is Hassel partly because of the emphasis she places on the complementary relation 
between codetermination and collective bargaining (so that any material erosion of 
codetermination means that collective bargaining proper will be less able to perform 
its regulative tasks) and partly because the growth in poorly regulated sectors 
increases the problem of collective action of employers’ confederations.  
In the present treatment, we intend to provide chapter and verse on the course 
of collective bargaining and worker representation over a longer period than 
previously examined, distinguishing between mutually exclusive sectoral agreements 
and firm-level collective bargaining, charting the growth of the collective bargaining 
free zone, and mapping changes in works council coverage. Our goal is to inform the 
wider debate although decentralization within sectoral bargaining that may be no less 
disruptive will perforce escape identification. Our maintained hypothesis is that if we  
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observe substantive long-term institutional change the German model is, as Hassel 
contends, more likely to be ‘disorganized’ and less likely to be distinctive. 
 
III. Data 
Our raw data source is the IAB Establishment Panel (or Betriebspanel), a stratified 
random sample of plants extracted from the population of all establishments with at 
least one employee covered by social insurance.
6 From the outset, the Establishment 
Panel was designed to provide a continuous analysis of the labor market in Germany 
and as a result it has an interesting longitudinal dimension, allowing us to follow a 
sizeable number of establishments in successive years over a substantial period of 
time. Over our sample period – 2000-2008 – the share of establishments that is 
observed in every single year (or ‘permanent stayers’) approximates 20 percent. The 
remaining 80 percent comprise pure panel rotations together with establishment births 
and deaths. 
Although the IAB establishment panel contains information on whether any 
given establishment was created before a certain date, establishments are generally 
not asked to provide their exact year of birth. Moreover, since the panel questionnaire 
is not always framed in the same way over time (and the management respondent may 
differ through time and/or provide inconsistent answers), exclusive reliance on 
Betriebspanel data involves a non-negligible possibility of error in coding the year of 
birth. More concretely, the actual survey procedure is to ask the establishment 
respondent whether or not the plant was founded prior to or after the year 1990. Only 
those answering that the plant was born in or after 1990 are then asked to provide the 
exact year of birth. The exception is those establishments that are interviewed for the 
first time, all of which are required to provide information on their year of birth.
7 
In analyzing our raw data, we pay very careful attention to this issue of births 
(as well as closings/deaths, described below) and the manner of their identification. 
To this end, we ran various checks to ensure correct enumeration of the number of 
births (and closings/deaths). To give a quick illustration of the problems of relying 
exclusively on the Betriebspanel, we found that for approximately 8 percent of all 
establishments over the sample period it was not possible to establish with precision 
whether the plant was founded before or after 1990. In addition, some 6 percent of 
those plants reporting that they were not born before 1990 failed to provide the same 
year of foundation in successive surveys.  
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In the light of these limitations, it is apparent that the Betriebspanel cannot 
provide an exact map of the year of establishment birth. We therefore decided to 
follow a different route to identify newly-born establishments. This procedure 
involved use of the establishment register (or Betriebsdatei). Specifically, for all 
establishments present in the Betriebspanel that were interviewed at least once over 
the 2000-2008 interval  (approximately 38,500 units in all), we generated Dt year 
dummies equal to 1 if the establishment was present in the Betriebsdatei in year t, 0 
otherwise (where t = 1995, 1996, …, 2009). Note further that  since (a) the 
Betriebsdatei contains, in any given year, all German establishments that have paid 
social security contributions for at least one of its employees, and (b) the 
Betriebspanel is drawn from the Betriebsdatei records, it follows that the two datasets 
share the same establishment identification code (or Betriebsnummer). This means, 
therefore, that at any given point in time it is possible to determine the year of birth of 
any establishment in the Betriebspanel, assuming that the first year of entry in the 
Betriebsdatei is the correct year of birth.
8 Finally, we should note that since the 
Betriebspanel is drawn one year in advance –  that is, the Betriebspanel for year t is 
extracted from the set of all establishments included in the Betriebsdatei in year t-1 – 
an establishment entering the former in year t for the first time will only be coded as a 
birth if it was observed in the latter in year t-1 but not prior to t-1.
9 
A similar procedure is used to code establishment closings/deaths. If 
establishment  j leaves the Betriebspanel in year t and it is not found in the 
Betriebsdatei in year t+1, it will be coded as a death in year t+1. We note 
parenthetically that up to the year 2009 we can also track closings/deaths occurring in 
the post-t+1 period. 
(Table 1 near here) 
In Table 1 we present the full set of sample categories and their definitions. 
The mutually exclusive or disjoint categories are such that in any given year it is 
possible to determine whether: (a) an establishment is in the panel for the first time; 
(b) it is a continuing or a newly-born establishment; (c) it is present in the panel in any 
of the following years; and (d) whether an establishment exit from the panel is due to 
pure rotation or an establishment death. In total, we have thirteen categories. These 
can then be aggregated to provide, in any given year, the share of births, deaths, and 
permanent stayers, inter al., as will be discussed in the findings section below. To our 
knowledge, this is the first time such a detailed decomposition has been attempted,  
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and we think it is worthwhile given our intention to understand the changing patterns 
of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany over a period of 
almost a full decade. We again note that such an exercise would be impossible 
without using the Betriebsdatei (i.e. in conjunction with the Betriebspanel).  
To put all our thirteen categories in a unified context, consider, for the sake of 
the argument, the year 2000. Here Group 1 (entry/birth), for example, is made up of 
all establishments that are in the IAB panel survey for the first time (i.e. they were not 
in the 1999 panel) and were actually born in 1999 according to the business register. 
Group 1 is to be distinguished from Group 2 in the sense that although establishments 
in the latter are also in the panel for the first time, the business register tells us they 
were born before 1999; from Group 5 since establishments in Group 1 are observed at 
least once after 2000 (i.e. they are not single-year stayers in the panel); and from 
Group 6 (Group 7) because establishments in Group 1 do not die/close in 2001 (or 
later). 
Group 4, comprising temporary stayers, is a residual category made up of 
those establishments that are observed in 2000 (and 1999) and after 2000. (It also can 
include establishments observed in 2000 and 2008 but not in every single year of the 
sample.) All single-year panel stayers populate Groups 5 through 10, while 
establishments exiting the panel in year 2000 (i.e. those observed in 2000 – and in 
1999 – but not later) occupy groups 11 to 13.
10  
Over the entire 2000-2008 period, the raw sample contains some 140,000 
observations. The following filters were then applied to generate a sample of nine 
cross-sections: first, the selection of all industries except agriculture and the extractive 
industries; second, the selection of establishments employing at least 5 employees 
(since this is the employment threshold for works council formation); third, the 
excision of plants where information on sales is not provided; and, finally, the 
exclusion of any public corporations. To be included all establishments had also to 
have information on their collective agreement and works council status. These 
restrictions resulted in a total of approximately 75,000 observations. All our results in 
the findings section below are cross-section weighted, using the inverse of the 
selection probability. Given the nature of the weighting process, it is generally the 





IV. The Course of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation, 2000-2008 
Data on the extent of collective bargaining coverage and worker representation by 
establishment and employment for each of the nine cross sections of data is 
documented in Appendix Table 1.  Figures 1 and 2 present the information in more 
digestible form. At the most general, all-German, level we see that collective 
bargaining has declined. But the decline is confined to the  sectoral level. Plant 
coverage of sectoral bargaining is down from 47.3 percent in 2000 to 35.4 percent in 
2008, while there is some tiny increase in firm-level collective bargaining. The 
corollary is a marked growth in the proportion of uncovered establishments: plants 
without a collective agreement of any kind have grown from 50.1 percent to 61.9 
percent of the total. For its part, the works council coverage of establishments has 
slowly but assuredly declined (see Figure 1). When one turns to examine collective 
bargaining coverage and worker representation by employment (see Figure 2) it is the 
case that the fall in sectoral bargaining is more muted (from 57.3 percent to 48.1 
percent), while there is again a modest rise in the share of firm-level agreements. 
Nevertheless, the growth in absence of collective bargaining coverage of any kind is 
still pronounced (up from 35.9 percent in 2000 to 44.2 percent in 2008). Interestingly, 
the share of workers in works council firms vastly exceeds the share of works council 
firms – since works councils proliferate in larger establishments – but the decline in 
works council coverage is still nontrivial on this measure (some 3.5 percentage 
points). 
(Figures 1 and 2 near here) 
  There are some marked differences in the course of collective bargaining and 
worker representation between the two halves of Germany. In the east, sectoral 
bargaining coverage by establishments is markedly lower than in the west but has 
declined less. In the west, equal numbers of firms had no collective bargaining as had 
sectoral agreements as early as 2002. If anything, firm-level bargaining is more 
entrenched in the east and admits of no decline (as is also true of the west). Although 
firms without collective bargaining of any type much more clearly dominate in the 
east, the growth of this sector has inevitably been much smaller in the east. On the 
other hand, both the incidence of and the pattern of decline in the share of plants with 
works councils is very similar in the two broad regions (see Figure 1). What further 
regional differences emerge when we turn to look at coverage by employment? 
Perhaps the most obvious reading of Figure 2 (vis-à-vis Figure 1) is that although the  
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aggregate results are more clearly driven by the west, the absolute trends tend to be 
closer. 
Two issues not considered earlier are the concept of orientation toward a 
sectoral collective agreement and the concatenation of works councils and collective 
bargaining. Beginning with the former, German employers often claim that though not 
party to a sectoral agreement they nonetheless orient themselves to one. Now 
orientation toward a collective agreement may in the limit amount to little more than 
monitoring, but by the same token it may constitute rather more than that. Clearly 
further investigation of this issue is required to establish the coerciveness or otherwise 
of such comparisons. Pending that inquiry, here we simply ask whether the fall in 
sectoral bargaining/rise in the collective bargaining free zone charted earlier has been 
accompanied by (possibly offsetting) changes in orientation. At the start of our sample 
period in 2000 some 25.2 percent of all establishments covering 18.7 percent of all 
employees claimed to orient themselves towards a collective agreement. By 2008 
these proportions had risen to 28.9 percent and 22.7 percent, respectively.
11 However, 
these increases in were eclipsed by the growth in the collective bargaining free zone, 
such that we observe a falling share of orienting establishments in this firmament; 
specifically, the share of plants claiming to orient themselves towards a collective 
agreement fell from 50.6 percent of establishments without a collective agreement in 
2000 to 47.9 percent of such plants in 2008. It is therefore hard to resist the 
conclusion that erosion also attaches to the admittedly black box of orientation. 
Next let us consider the joint presence of both pillars of the German system of 
industrial relations: collective bargaining and workplace codetermination. Although 
not reported in our tables, the proportion of establishments (employees) covered 
neither by collective agreements nor by works councils rose from 47.7 percent (29.1 
percent) in 2000 to 59.6 percent (35.3 percent) in 2008. The increase was monotonic 
in the case of employment. Correspondingly the proportion of establishments 
(employees) having both industrial relations institutions was 7.9 percent (38.5 
percent) in 2000, falling to 5.8 percent (32.9 percent) in 2008. More specifically, at 
the start of the period, 6.5 percent (32.7 percent) of establishments (employees) were 
covered by sectoral agreements and works councils whereas eight years later only 4.8 
percent (26.6 percent) of establishments (employees) were in that position.
12 This 
indicates  a clear erosion of the dual system. And overall, while works council  
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coverage by establishment and employment fell in sectors with collective bargaining, 
works council growth was recorded in sectors without collective bargaining.   
(Figures 3 near here) 
To what extent do the results formally  reported thus far compound very 
different trends at a truly more disaggregate level? To address this issue Appendix 
Tables 2 through 4 examine the same body of evidence considered earlier for three 
different configurations of the sample: permanent stayers, newly-founded 
establishments, and closing establishments, respectively. Also as before this 
information is presented graphically (in Figures 3 through 5). Beginning with those 
firms that were present in each wave of the sample period – the category of permanent 
stayers – the coverage by establishment data summarized in Figure 3 closely 
resembles those reported earlier for the full sample. This is not simply for the all-
German case but also for east and west Germany as well. Thus, for Germany as a 
whole, sectoral bargaining coverage by establishment declined from 50.1 percent in 
2000 to 40.1 percent in 2008 and the share of establishments without collective 
bargaining of any sort rose from 47.9 percent to 57.6 percent, somewhat less marked 
than in the entire cross section. Works council coverage also declined but again less 
markedly. We observe a broadly similar stability in firm-level collective bargaining 
coverage. There are no major differences at regional level.  
(Figure 4 near here) 
Greater differences emerge from Figure 4 when we consider coverage by 
employment. Thus, the gap between sectoral agreements and absence of any 
agreement admits of less convergence for the permanent stayer sample even if the 
trends in each are directionally the same. There are also some indications of an 
increase in works council coverage on this measure. But the main results still stand: a 
decline in traditional collective bargaining and growth in no agreements. That said, 
the decline in sectoral bargaining is much less in evidence for east Germany and there 
is no employment growth in the no-agreement sector. Both indicators in fact display 
broad stability. Firm-level agreements are somewhat more important in the east than 
before. 
(Figure 5 near here) 
If the results for permanent stayers rather closely resemble those reported for 
the overall sample, what of the experience of newly founded enterprises? Figure 5, 
which presents results for Germany as a whole (but see Appendix Table 3 for the  
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regional breakdowns), indicates that the reach of sectoral agreements using either 
establishment or employment coverage is much lower than for the preceding groups 
and the importance of the no agreement category correspondingly somewhat elevated. 
But although the changes are more muted we can say that the directional movements 
in each are directionally as before for employment coverage (if not establishment 
coverage). Thus, the employment coverage of sectoral agreements fell from 41.8 
percent to 38.4 percent while that of the collective bargaining free sector rose from 
52.6 percent to 54.3 percent. (For west Germany, the trends in sectoral bargaining 
coverage by establishment mirror these results.). Works council employment and 
establishment coverage declined for both parts of Germany but increased in the case 
of firm-level bargaining.  
(Figure 6 near here) 
Finally, Figure 6 summarizes the situation for plant closings and deaths. 
Perhaps the first observation to be made is that the collective bargaining coverage of 
plants that close or die is not consistently higher than that of survivors (although more 
so in the case of employment coverage). By the same token the coverage of the 
collective bargaining free zone is sometimes higher and sometimes lower among the 
former group. Nor for that matter is works council employment coverage greater. 
Rather, the distinctive feature of plant closings/deaths resides in trends that closely 
match those of the full sample. Thus, their sectoral agreement coverage by 
establishment (employment) fell from 31.3 percent (45.4 percent) in 2000 to 23.5 
percent (39.2 percent) in 2008. The corresponding increases in absence of any 
coverage were from 61 percent (45.8 percent) in 2000 to 74.2 percent (53.8 percent) 
in 2008. Pari passu with the full sample, works council coverage trended down while 
firm-level bargaining increased somewhat. 
Similarities in disaggregations of the data are more common than the 
differences. Vulgo: sectoral bargaining is in retreat and there is a rise (often steep) in 
the collective bargaining free zone. Reflecting the latter phenomenon there is no 
suggestion of a sustained increase in firm-level collective bargaining. There is also no 
suggestion of an increase in worker representation through works councils. Indeed the 
evidence is to the contrary so that taken in conjunction with our other findings the 
implication may well be that there is also a growing codetermination free zone. One 
tantalizing result is that closing establishments show no tendency to be more subject 
to sectoral collective bargaining than their surviving counterparts.       
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In Tables 2 through 4 we present evidence on establishment transitions into 
and out of collective agreements and works councils. In other words, whereas in 
Figures 1 through 6 (and Appendix Tables 1 through 4) we traced 
establishment/employment coverage of institutions in successive cross-sections, now 
the focus shifts to the behavior of individual plants with respect to the same 
institutional set: firstly, on a year-to-year basis; and, secondly, over the entire 2000-
2008 interval.  
(Table 2 near here) 
Annual transitions are first provided in Table 2 for overlapping cross sections. 
We consider all possible movements: introductions, abolitions, and no changes in 
status. The latter category includes situations in which the institution in question 
either ‘always’ existed or ‘never’ existed. Thus, for example, from 2000 to 2001, we 
see that 92 percent of all establishments in Germany did not change their 2000 
sectoral agreement status: in 44.9 (47.4) percent of the cases the sectoral agreement 
was always (never) present. By the end of the sample period, roughly the same share 
recording no change in status (i.e. 93 percent) is observed. Alternatively put, 7 to 8 
percent of all establishments change their sectoral collective bargaining status over the 
course of a year, which nevertheless amounts to a fairly considerable amount of 
churning. Note also that while 44.9 percent of the entire cross section was covered by 
a sectoral agreement in 2000 and 2001, by the end of the sample period just 32.7 
percent of those covered by sectoral bargaining in 2007 maintained that status in 
2008. These movements represent a quite dramatic pattern of decline and are 
indicative of the erosion in sectoral bargaining. (Confirming the evidence presented 
earlier, the fall in sectoral agreements is, with one exception, monotonically 
decreasing over our sample period.) A reverse pattern obtains in respect of those 
plants never covered by a sectoral agreement: these climbed from 47.4 percent of the 
total in the first column to 60.7 percent in the last column of the table.  
Firm-level agreements give the appearance of being an endangered species, 
with around 97 percent of establishments never being covered by this regime in the 
overlapping cross sections. Correspondingly, changes in firm-level collective 
bargaining appear tiny. But again observe that in all cases the proportions refer to the 
share of sample establishments so that there is in fact fairly considerable outward 
migration. And as far as works councils are concerned, we observe that they are 
present in roughly 10 percent of all establishments. Changes in status are fairly similar  
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to those observed for firm-level agreements and hence are much smaller relatively 
speaking.
13 
Regional differences are most marked in the case of sectoral collective 
bargaining insofar as the share of ‘never existing’ agreements is much higher in the 
east by an almost 20 percentage point margin. Also note that the introduction of firm-
level agreements is consistently higher in the east. Regional differences in transitions 
in the case of works councils are altogether more muted. 
(Table 3 near here) 
These patterns in sectoral agreements, firm-level collective agreements, and 
worker representation generally carry over to the population of permanent stayers. 
The situation is depicted in Table 3.  In particular, the ‘always existing’ sectoral 
agreement category is persistently higher among permanent stayers than for the whole 
cross-section (cf. the first column of Table 2), a natural result given that permanent 
stayers are on average of bigger size than the average establishment in the population. 
(Table 4 near here) 
Finally, in Table 4, we present eight-year transitions for the set of permanent 
stayers. As expected, for sectoral agreements there are now considerably more joiners 
and leavers than in the annual transition data. Thus, despite considerable institutional 
inertia, in approximately 20 percent of such cases establishments surveyed in both 
2000 and 2008 do switch status. In other words, one establishment in five either 
leaves or joins sectoral agreements. The former predominate by about three to one. 
Unsurprisingly, changes in works council status over the sample period are much less 
common than for sectoral agreements, at around 6 percent of the total. But even these 
modest movements are larger than previously observed in the literature. In turn, given 
that only a small fraction of establishments are actually covered by a firm-level 
agreement, the reported share of bargaining cessations of 1.4 percent among all 
permanent stayers again shows that transitions out of firm bargaining are quite 
substantial – a little over one-half (=1.4/2.6) of them will quit bargaining by 2008. 
Over this interval, east Germany records smaller gross changes (i.e. introductions plus 





V. Concluding Remarks  
Our principal finding is that the erosion in sectoral collective bargaining first observed 
in the 1990s is ongoing. Moreover, the decline is more or less across the board, such 
that the similarities observed in disaggregations of the data (across permanent stayers, 
newly-founded firms, and closing establishments) in this regard are more common 
than the differences. One interesting subsidiary finding, however, is that closing 
establishments (if not their newly-founded counterparts) are no more likely to be 
covered by sectoral agreements than the generality of establishments. There are of 
course marked regional differences in levels of coverage and the process of 
change/erosion in also more pronounced in western Germany, We have even raised 
the possibility of a process of convergence, a latter day Drang nach Osten as it were.  
We also detect some erosion in works council coverage. Although this trend is 
not always apparent in the data, it seems that Hassel’s (1999) empirical finding is 
sustained.  In other words, there is some indication of a decline in codetermination at 
plant level which may in turn support Hassel’s distinctive conjecture, although there 
is no indication that works council coverage has held up better in sectors with 
collective agreements. Be that as it may, the dual system seems unequivocally to be in 
retreat. 
Interestingly, there is no real suggestion of any material increase in firm-level 
collective bargaining. So this is not really where one should look for evidence of 
decentralization. Although we cannot directly answer whether decentralization is 
regulated or organized since our data do not allow us to pierce the veil of individual 
sectoral agreements, we might conclude from the decline in sectoral bargaining and 
the accompanying sharp rise in the establishment and employment coverage of a 
collective bargaining free zone that decentralization has been uncontrolled.  
Finally, the transitions data generally support pattern of erosion identified 
here. They further indicate that there is no increasing trend out of sectoral agreements 
and into firm-level agreements. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. Nevertheless, 
the amount of switching between the two types of collective agreement is robust and 
further investigation of the dynamics may throw further light on the process of 
erosion.   






1. On these innovations, see Addison et al., 2009, and the references contained 
therein. 
2. She reports that the share of employees in plants with works councils in the private 
sector fell from 52.4 percent in 1981 through 47.3 percent in 1990 to 41.6 percent in 
1994. 
3. Studies of works council coverage are typically separate. The best-known such 
studies have been those conducted by the Institute for Economic and Social 
Research/WSI (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut) of the Hans-
Böckler-Stiftung. Every two years since 1998 the WSI has conducted representative 
nationwide surveys of works councils (see Schäfer, 2005). The surveys contain 
information on coverage as well as the attitude of works councils on collective 
bargaining issues, including the decentralization of collective bargaining through 
opening clauses and pacts for employment and competitiveness.  
4. Lacking consistent data, we do not consider employee representation vehicles other 
than works councils. On the reach of such company-specific forms of employee 
representation, see Ellguth (2006); Ellguth and Kohaut (2008).  
5. For as similar conclusion based on an analysis of concession bargaining under pacts 
for employment and competitiveness, see Massa-Wirth and Niechoj (2004). 
6. For a detailed description of the dataset, see Fischer et al., 2009. 
7. Three surveys within our sample period – those for 2000, 2004, and 2007 – 
inquired as to the year of birth of all establishments. 
8. Clearly, the two will diverge if the establishment fails to pay the social security tax 
in a timely fashion and this is a limitation of our approach. By the same token, our 
approach offers a consistent strategy since we also use the establishment register to 
identify deaths. 
9. To be on the safe side, we actually checked for presence in the Betriebsdatei up to 
year t-5. 
10. Observe that the five categories in the study by Addison et al. (2009) can easily be 
derived from this 13-group disaggregation. 
11. As before, there were marked differences between east and west: in the western 
half of Germany the share of orienting firms (employees) rose from 23.2 percent (17.3 
percent) to 28.3 percent (21.9 percent), whereas in the east declines in both shares 
were reported. Full details are available from the authors upon request.  
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12. Corresponding values for joint coverage by firm-level agreements and works 
councils were 1.4 percent (5.8 percent) in 2000 and 1.0 percent (6.3 percent) in 2008. 
13. We also investigated movements between types of collective bargaining. For 
Germany as a whole, movements out of sectoral into firm-level agreements declined 
through time: from 1.0 percent in 2000/2001 to 0.7 percent in 2007/2008. The same 
downward tendency was apparent in both halves of Germany. And at a time of 
declining sectoral agreements, considerable movement out of firm-level into sectoral 
collective bargaining is still observed. For Germany as a whole, 18.8 percent (14.5 
percent) of establishments covered by a firm-level collective agreement in 2000 
(2007) switched to a sectoral agreement in 2001 (2008). Such switching was always 
lower – oftentimes very much lower – in eastern than in western Germany. Full 
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The Categories of the Sample and their Definitions 
 
#   Main categories    #   Subcategories  Definitions: in a given year t. an establishment j in the sample either:- 
1  entry/birth      was born in t-1 and is observed again in t+1 (and possibly some time later)  1 Entry 
2 entry/existing      is a continuing establishment (i.e. it was observed before t-1) and is observed again in t+1 (and possibly some time later) 
2  permanent stayer    3  permanent stayer      is observed in every single year of the interval 2000-2008 
3  temporary stayer  4  temporary stayer      was observed at least once before t and at least once after t 
5  1-period-stayer/birth/leaver      is only observed in t and was born in t-1 
  6  1-period-stayer/birth/dead ‘A’         is only observed in t and was born in t-1 and dies in t+1 
7  1-period-stayer/birth/dead ‘B’      is only observed in t and was born in t-1 and dies after t+1 
8  1-period-stayer/leaver      is only observed in t and is a continuing establishment and leaves the panel in t+1 
9  1-period-stayer/dead ‘A’      is only observed in t and is a continuing establishment and dies in t+1 
4 1-period-stayer 
10  1-period-stayer/dead ‘B’      is only observed in t and is a continuing establishment and dies after t+1 
11  exit/leaver      was observed at least once in the interval between 1999 and t and leaves the panel in t+1 
12  exit/dead ‘A’      was observed at least once in the interval between 1999 and t and dies in t+1 
5 Exit 







Annual Transitions in Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2004, All Establishments, Weighted Data 
 
    From 2000 to 2001  From 2001 to 2002  From 2002 to 2003  From 2003 to 2004 
        Germany West  East Germany West  East Germany West  East Germany West  East 
Always existing  44.9%  50.1%  25.5% 42.1%  47.8% 22.3% 42.4%  47.3%  21.0% 38.8%  43.4% 19.8% 
Introduced 3.6%  3.8%  2.5% 2.9%  3.3% 1.5% 2.9%  3.0%  2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 3.1% 
Abolished 4.2%  4.7%  2.4% 5.0% 5.1% 4.4%  4.5% 4.9% 3.0% 4.6% 5.3% 1.6% 
Never existing  47.4%  41.3%  69.6% 50.1%  43.8% 71.8% 50.1%  44.8%  73.2% 53.9%  48.6% 75.6% 




















N  589,260 462,960 126,301 655,613 508,618 146,994  644,837 524,244 120,593 719,959 579,002 140,958 
Always existing  1.6%  1.1%  3.6% 1.8%  1.3% 3.3% 1.5%  1.1%  3.2% 1.3% 1.0% 2.7% 
Introduced 1.0%  0.9%  1.1% 0.8%  0.8% 1.0% 0.5%  0.4%  0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 
Abolished 0.8%  0.8%  1.0% 0.9% 1.0% 0.6%  0.6% 0.5% 1.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.9% 
Never existing  96.5%  97.2%  94.3% 96.5%  96.9% 95.1% 97.4%  98.0%  94.9% 97.6%  98.1% 95.5% 






















N  589,261 462,960 126,301 655,612 508,618 146,994  644,837 524,245 120,593 719,959 579,001 140,957 
Always existing  10.9%  11.1%  9.9% 8.2%  8.4% 77.6% 8.7%  8.8%  7.9% 7.8% 7.7% 8.1% 
Introduced 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 1.4%  1.5% 1.2% 0.7%  0.7%  0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 
Abolished 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 2.6% 2.7% 2.3%  0.8% 0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 
Never existing  89.1%  88.9%  90.1% 87.8%  87.5% 88.9% 89.9%  89.6%  91.4% 90.9%  91.0% 90.7% 















N  589,261 462,960 126,301 654,156 507,359 146,795  645,838 525,245 120,593 716,219 575,637 140,582 
 
 




TABLE 2 (Cont.) 
 
    From 2004 to 2005  From 2005 to 2006  From 2006 to 2007  From 2007 to 2008 
      Germany  West   East  Germany  West   East  Germany  West   East  Germany  West   East 
Always existing  36.7%  40.7%  20.3% 36.2%  39.7% 21.3%  34.1% 37.7% 18.8% 32.7% 35.9% 20.3%
Introduced  3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 2.0% 2.0% 2.1%  2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 3.2% 3.6% 1.7%
Abolished  3.3% 3.6% 2.0% 4.3% 4.6% 2.8%  3.8% 4.2% 2.0% 3.3% 3.4% 2.9%
Never existing  56.6%  52.3%  74.4% 57.5%  53.7% 73.8%  59.8% 55.8% 76.8% 60.7% 57.0% 75.1%




















N  675,115 545,698 129,777 699,631 566,607 133,023  687,950 557,298 130,653 719,404 571,266 148,137
Always  existing  2.0% 1.6% 3.3% 1.6% 1.2% 3.0%  1.5% 1.1% 3.4% 1.7% 1.2% 3.9%
Introduced  0.6% 0.4% 1.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.9%  0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5%
Abolished  0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7%  0.7% 0.6% 1.0% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6%
Never existing  97.0%  97.5%  94.8% 97.4%  97.8% 95.5%  97.3% 98.0% 94.4% 97.1% 97.6% 95.0%






















N  675,155 545,338 129,777 699,630 566,607 133,022  687,950 557,298 130,652 719,403 571,267 148,137
Always  existing  8.4% 8.5% 7.8% 8.2% 8.2% 8.4%  8.1% 8.2% 7.8% 7.7% 7.8% 7.4%
Introduced  0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2%  0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.3%
Abolished  0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.5%  0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Never existing  90.8%  90.7%  91.2% 90.6%  90.5% 90.9%  91.2% 91.1% 91.7% 91.2% 91.1% 91.9%





















 TABLE 3 
Annual Transitions in Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2004, Permanent Stayers, Weighted Data 
 
    From 2000 to 2001  From 2001 to 2002  From 2002 to 2003  From 2003 to 2004 
    Germany  West   East  Germany  West   East  Germany  West   East  Germany  West   East 
Always  existing  46.7% 53.3%  26.0% 44.2% 52.0% 23.1%  46.3%  53.6% 23.7%  44.1% 51.4% 22.8%
Introduced  2.8% 2.5%  3.5% 2.9% 3.3%  1.9% 2.5%  2.7%  1.9% 1.5% 1.5%  1.5%
Abolished  2.7% 3.1%  1.7% 4.6% 4.6%  4.6% 3.4%  3.8%  2.3% 4.1% 5.0%  1.5%
Never  existing  47.9% 41.1%  68.8% 48.2% 40.1% 70.3%  47.8%  39.9% 72.1%  50.2% 42.1% 74.2%




















N  151,853 114,735 37,118 157,265 114,924 42,341  155,478 117,424 38,054  148,167 110,602 37,565
Always  existing  2.3% 1.5%  4.6% 2.1% 1.2% 4.6%  1.3%  0.8% 3.0% 1.8% 1.3%  3.2%
Introduced  1.4% 1.6%  1.1% 0.3% 0.2%  0.4% 0.5%  0.5%  0.5% 1.2% 1.5%  0.3%
Abolished  0.3% 0.0%  1.2% 1.2% 1.3%  0.9% 0.8%  0.7%  1.0% 0.2% 0.1%  0.4%
Never  existing  95.9% 96.9%  93.1% 96.5% 97.3% 94.1%  97.4%  98.1% 95.5%  96.8% 97.0% 96.1%






















N  151,853 114,734 37,118 157,265 114,924 42,341  155,478 117,424 38,054  148,166 110,603 37,564
Always existing  11.1%  10.7%  12.4% 7.6%  7.6% 7.7%  8.5%  8.8% 7.8% 8.9% 9.1%  8.3%
Introduced  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.9% 1.1%  0.5% 0.7%  0.9%  0.1% 0.2% 0.1%  0.3%
Abolished  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 3.1% 3.2%  2.8% 0.4%  0.4%  0.3% 0.4% 0.3%  0.6%
Never  existing  88.9% 89.3%  87.6% 88.4% 88.1% 89.1%  90.4%  89.9% 91.8%  90.5% 90.5% 90.8%






















TABLE 3 (Cont.) 
  
    From 2004 to 2005  From 2005 to 2006  From 2006 to 2007  From 2007 to 2008 
    Germany West    East  Germany West    East  Germany West    East  Germany West    East 
Always  existing 42.6%  48.4%  24.2% 41.2%  46.6% 24.5% 37.7%  42.8% 21.7% 36.6% 41.4%  22.6% 
Introduced 3.0%  2.3%  4.9% 1.1%  1.3% 0.5% 2.0%  1.7% 2.9% 3.5% 4.3%  1.3% 
Abolished 2.8%  2.9%  2.2% 3.3%  3.1% 3.7% 4.6%  5.8% 0.8% 3.5% 3.2%  4.2% 
Never  existing 51.7%  46.4%  68.7% 54.4%  48.9% 71.3% 55.7%  49.7% 74.5% 56.4% 51.0%  71.9% 




















N  150,288 114,463 35,824  148,835 112,449 36,385  147,964 112,206 35,758 151,394 112,196  39,198 
Always  existing 2.7%  2.5%  3.2% 2.5%  2.1% 3.6% 1.8%  1.1% 4.1% 2.1% 1.0%  5.2% 
Introduced 0.3%  0.0%  1.2% 0.3%  0.1% 0.9% 0.7%  0.6% 1.2% 0.3% 0.1%  0.8% 
Abolished 0.1%  0.1%  0.3% 0.4%  0.4% 0.6% 1.3%  1.3% 1.2% 0.7% 0.7%  0.7% 
Never  existing 96.9%  97.4%  95.3% 96.7%  97.4% 94.8% 96.1%  97.0% 93.5% 96.9% 98.2%  93.4% 






















N  150,287 114,463 35,824  148,835 112,449 36,385  147,965 112,206 35,758 151,394 112,196  39,198 
Always  existing 8.4%  8.6%  7.6% 8.6%  8.7% 8.2% 9.4%  9.9% 7.7% 8.8% 9.1%  8.0% 
Introduced 0.4%  0.4%  0.3% 0.5%  0.6% 0.1% 0.2%  0.2% 0.1% 0.9% 1.1%  0.5% 
Abolished 0.5%  0.6%  0.3% 0.8%  0.9% 0.4% 0.1%  0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%  0.1% 
Never  existing 90.7%  90.4%  91.8% 90.1%  89.8% 91.2% 90.4%  89.8% 92.0% 90.0% 89.5%  91.5% 





















Eight-year Transitions in Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status for Germany and by Broad Region, 
2000-2008, Permanent Stayers, Weighted Data 
 
  Sectoral Agreement  Firm-level Agreement  Works Council 
    Germany West    East Germany West    East Germany West    East 
Always existing  35.1%  40.8%  18.9%  1.2% 0.6%  3.1%  8.3% 8.5%  7.8% 
Introduced 5.0%    5.0%  5.0% 1.2% 0.5%  2.9%  1.4% 1.7%  0.6% 
Abolished 15.0%  16.4%  11.1%  1.4% 1.0%  2.6%  4.4% 4.1%  5.5% 
Never  existing 44.9%  37.9%  64.9% 96.2%  97.9%  91.4% 85.8%  85.7%  86.1% 
Net  change  -10.1% -11.5% -6.2%  -0.2%  -0.4%  0.3%  -3.0%  -2.4% -4.9% 
N  151,394 112,196 39,198  151,394 112,196 39,198  151,394 112,196 39,198 
 





APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2008, All 
Establishments, Weighted Data 
                                   









Council  Totals 
Year  Region  I II  I  II I II I II  I  II 
2000  Germany 47.3% 57.3% 2.5% 6.8% 50.1% 35.9% 10.3% 45.2% 855,135 20,063,803
  West 52.3% 60.9% 2.2% 6.2% 45.5% 32.9% 10.4% 46.9% 687,189 16,740,291
  East 26.9% 39.3% 4.1% 9.9% 69.0% 50.8% 10.1% 36.8% 167,946 3,323,512
2001  Germany 45.8% 57.3% 2.6% 9.2% 51.6% 35.1% 10.2% 46.0% 823,286 19,646,467
  West 50.6% 61.5% 2.2% 6.5% 47.3% 32.0% 10.2% 47.7% 659,853 16,265,407
  East 26.5% 37.2% 4.4% 12.9% 69.1% 49.8% 9.9% 37.5% 163,433 3,381,060
2002  Germany 44.2% 56.8% 2.5% 7.0% 53.3% 36.2% 9.2% 45.8% 846,571 19,789,917
  West 49.1% 60.7% 2.1% 6.0% 48.9% 33.2% 9.3% 47.3% 685,555 16,543,690
  East 23.6% 36.6% 4.4% 11.8% 72.0% 51.6% 9.0% 38.5% 161,016 3,246,226
2003  Germany 43.2% 55.9% 2.1% 7.1% 54.8% 37.0% 8.9% 44.7% 841,910 19,676,598
  West 48.3% 59.6% 1.7% 6.5% 50.0% 33.9% 9.0% 46.2% 678,465 16,426,937
  East 22.0% 36.9% 3.6% 10.1% 74.4% 53.1% 8.5% 36.9% 163,445 3,249,662
2004  Germany 40.0% 54.4% 2.4% 7.3% 57.6% 38.4% 8.6% 44.0% 836,702 19,548,250
  West 44.3% 58.1% 2.1% 6.7% 53.6% 35.3% 8.7% 45.3% 674,037 16,301,180
  East 22.3% 35.7% 3.5% 10.2% 74.2% 54.0% 8.3% 37.4% 162,664 3,247,070
2005  Germany 39.8% 52.9% 2.6% 7.7% 57.6% 39.4% 9.0% 43.5% 826,191 19,534,713
  West 43.7% 56.2% 2.2% 7.2% 54.1% 36.7% 9.2% 45.0% 668,722 16,340,323
  East 23.5% 36.2% 4.3% 10.6% 72.3% 53.2% 8.2% 36.1% 157,469 3,194,390
2006  Germany 37.4% 50.5% 2.2% 7.6% 60.4% 41.9% 8.7% 42.6% 854,739 20,300,287
  West 40.7% 53.6% 1.7% 6.8% 57.6% 39.6% 8.8% 43.9% 696,283 16,993,144
  East 23.0% 34.9% 4.0% 11.6% 73.0% 53.5% 8.3% 35.7% 158,455 3,307,143
2007  Germany 36.1% 49.6% 2.3% 7.1% 61.6% 43.3% 8.2% 41.8% 845,867 20,877,923
  West 39.5% 52.6% 1.8% 6.4% 58.8% 41.0% 8.3% 43.4% 687,572 17,544,698
  East 21.6% 33.8% 4.4% 11.2% 74.0% 55.0% 7.9% 33.7% 158,294 3,333,224
2008  Germany 35.4% 48.1% 2.7% 7.7% 61.9% 44.2% 8.1% 41.7% 890,681 21,860,557
  West 38.5% 51.0% 2.2% 7.1% 59.3% 41.9% 8.2% 43.3% 716,913 18,248,031
    East 22.7% 33.5% 4.4% 10.9% 72.9% 55.6% 7.6% 33.8% 173,768 3,612,526
 




APPENDIX TABLE 2 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2008, Permanent 
Stayers, Weighted Data 
                                   









Council  Totals 
Year  Region  I II  I  II I II I II  I  II 
2000 Germany 50.1% 60.0% 2.0% 5.0% 47.9% 35.0% 10.6% 41.5% 171,876 4,028,286
  West 57.3% 65.9% 1.2% 3.8% 41.5% 30.3% 10.3% 42.6% 132,017 3,137,725
  East 26.2% 39.1% 4.6% 9.1% 69.2% 51.8% 11.5% 37.8% 39,859  890,561
2001 Germany 49.4% 59.0% 3.7% 6.5% 46.8% 34.4% 11.1% 43.6% 151,853 3,852,728
  West 55.9% 64.7% 3.1% 5.0% 41.0% 30.2% 10.7% 44.7% 114,735 2,993,209
  East 29.5% 39.2% 5.7% 11.8% 64.8% 49.0% 12.4% 39.8% 37,118 859,518
2002 Germany 47.2% 59.4% 2.4% 6.6% 50.5% 34.1% 8.6% 42.5% 157,265 3,872,532
  West 55.3% 66.0% 1.4% 5.0% 43.3% 29.0% 8.7% 44.7% 114,924 2,971,354
  East 25.1% 37.6% 5.0% 11.5% 69.9% 50.9% 8.1% 34.9% 42,341 901,177
2003 Germany 48.7% 59.7% 1.8% 7.2% 49.4% 33.1% 9.2% 45.6% 155,478 4,042,618
  West 56.3% 65.3% 1.3% 6.2% 42.5% 28.6% 9.7% 47.8% 117,424 3,156,874
  East 25.6% 40.1% 3.5% 10.9% 70.9% 49.0% 7.9% 38.0% 38,054 885,744
2004 Germany 45.7% 56.4% 3.0% 7.7% 51.3% 35.9% 9.1% 43.8% 148,167 3,682,439
  West 52.9% 62.1% 2.9% 6.9% 44.2% 31.0% 9.2% 45.4% 110,602 2,875,064
  East 24.3% 36.1% 3.5% 10.5% 72.2% 53.4% 8.6% 38.3% 37,565 807,375
2005 Germany 45.5% 55.9% 3.0% 6.7% 51.5% 37.4% 8.7% 41.9% 150,288 3,605,185
  West 50.7% 60.1% 2.5% 5.7% 46.8% 34.3% 9.0% 43.0% 114,463 2,834,727
  East 29.1% 40.3% 4.4% 10.6% 66.5% 49.1% 7.9% 37.7% 35,824 770,458
2006 Germany 42.3% 55.5% 2.8% 6.9% 54.8% 37.7% 9.1% 44.4% 148,835 3,664,627
  West 48.0% 60.2% 2.2% 6.0% 49.8% 33.8% 9.3% 46.4% 112,449 2,898,135
  East 25.0% 37.6% 4.6% 10.3% 70.4% 52.2% 8.3% 36.7% 36,385 766,492
2007 Germany 39.7% 53.7% 2.6% 7.1% 57.8% 39.2% 9.5% 46.7% 147,964 3,947,225
  West 44.5% 57.6% 1.7% 6.5% 53.8% 36.0% 10.1% 49.3% 112,206 3,170,173
  East 24.6% 38.1% 5.3% 9.7% 70.0% 52.2% 7.7% 36.2% 35,758  777,053
2008 Germany 40.1% 52.8% 2.4% 7.4% 57.6% 39.8% 9.7% 48.0% 151,394 4,045,311
  West 45.7% 56.8% 1.1% 6.0% 53.2% 37.2% 10.2% 50.3% 112,196 3,179,942
  East 23.9% 38.1% 6.0% 12.6% 70.1% 49.4% 8.4% 39.7% 39,198 865,369




APPENDIX TABLE 3 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-2008, Newly- 
Founded Establishments, Weighted Data 
                                   









Council  Totals 
Year  Region  I II  I  II I II I II I  II 
2000 Germany 33.0% 41.8% 2.2% 5.6% 64.8% 52.6% 6.1% 38.1% 51,767  922,628
  West 38.6% 43.4% 2.3% 6.2% 59.1% 50.4% 6.2% 40.7% 39,502  742,246
  East 15.0% 35.6% 2.0% 3.0% 83.0% 61.4% 5.8% 27.5% 12,265  180,382
2001 Germany 30.0% 43.8% 5.0% 10.2% 65.0% 46.0% 10.5% 38.8% 47,494  805,435
  West 38.1% 50.6% 6.1% 10.4% 55.8% 39.0% 11.9% 41.4% 35,637  661,509
 East  5.7%  12.9%  1.8% 9.0% 92.5% 78.1% 6.5% 26.9% 11,857  143,926
2002 Germany 30.9% 46.3% 2.0% 7.1% 67.2% 46.6% 6.6% 37.8% 50,909  842,489
  West 33.1% 49.4% 1.2% 5.5% 65.7% 45.1% 5.9% 38.0% 43,083  706,103
  East 18.8% 30.3% 6.2% 15.3% 75.0% 54.4% 10.3% 37.0% 7,826 136,386
2003 Germany 35.1% 31.6% 1.9% 9.7% 63.0% 58.7% 5.6% 28.5% 6,661 100,132
  West 54.8% 38.9% 3.0% 12.5% 42.2% 48.5% 6.3% 30.7% 3,790 64,771
 East  9.2%  18.2%  0.4% 4.5% 90.4% 77.3% 4.6% 24.5% 2,871 35,361
2004 Germany 27.7% 39.0% 3.6% 9.9% 68.7% 51.1% 7.2% 36.5% 56,895  981,487
  West 31.2% 42.0% 4.2% 10.8% 64.6% 47.2% 8.7% 39.1% 41,378  749,189
  East 18.5% 29.5% 1.8% 6.8% 79.7% 63.7% 2.2% 8.2% 15,517  232,298
2005 Germany 37.0% 42.6% 1.2% 4.5% 61.8% 52.9% 6.5% 23.0% 60,896  952,386
  West 38.4% 43.0% 0.7% 3.7% 61.0% 53.3% 7.2% 25.6% 50,308  783,083
  East 33.3% 40.9% 3.7% 7.9% 65.6% 51.2% 3.2% 11.3% 10,589  169,303
2006 Germany 30.8% 40.4% 2.8% 5.9% 66.4% 53.7% 7.4% 24.2% 64,603 1,003,675
  West 33.2% 44.0% 2.6% 4.9% 64.2% 51.1% 8.4% 26.4% 50,235  802,905
  East 22.5% 26.1% 3.6% 9.6% 74.0% 64.3% 3.6% 15.4% 14,369  200,770
2007 Germany 29.6% 39.0% 3.7% 4.3% 66.8% 56.7% 4.7% 24.7% 68,967 1,198,914
  West 31.2% 41.2% 4.2% 3.6% 64.6% 55.2% 4.5% 25.9% 55,260  982,876
  East 22.9% 29.0% 1.5% 7.2% 75.6% 63.8% 5.5% 19.1% 13,708  216,038
2008 Germany 32.5% 38.4% 3.3% 7.3% 64.2% 54.3% 5.2% 25.6% 74,172 1,208,916
  West 33.9% 39.1% 3.4% 7.4% 62.7% 53.5% 5.2% 26.4% 60,048 1,012,792
  East 26.4% 34.6% 2.9% 6.7% 70.7% 58.7% 5.0% 21.4% 14,124  196,124
       Notes: Newly-founded establishments correspond to the sum of groups 1, 5, 6, and 7 in Table 1.  





APPENDIX TABLE 4 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage for Germany and by Broad Regions, 2000-2008, 
Closing/Failing Establishments, Weighted Data 
                                   









Council  Totals 
Year  Region  I II I II I II I II I  II 
2000 Germany 31.3% 45.4%  7.7% 8.8% 61.0% 45.8% 13.3% 30.8% 27,253 480,266
 West  35.9%  51.9%  6.8% 6.2% 57.4% 41.9% 13.9% 30.3% 20,131 343,376
 East  18.4%  29.0%  10.3% 15.4% 71.3% 55.7% 11.7% 32.1% 7,122 136,890
2001 Germany 33.6% 46.0%  2.7% 7.2% 63.7% 46.7% 14.9% 41.7% 30,049 528,762
 West  35.2%  48.4%  1.4% 6.2% 63.4% 45.4% 13.8% 44.2% 21,345 409,982
 East  29.7%  37.8%  5.9% 10.8% 64.3% 51.4% 17.5% 33.0% 8,703 118,780
2002 Germany 48.7% 53.7%  2.2% 6.9% 49.1% 39.4% 14.0% 39.3% 38,510 618,349
  West 53.9% 60.9%  0.9% 3.1% 45.2% 36.1% 13.7% 38.3% 29,910 478,306
 East  30.6%  29.4%  6.8% 19.9% 62.6% 50.7% 15.2% 42.9% 8,601 140,043
2003 Germany 51.0% 57.7%  1.5% 5.9% 47.5% 36.4% 14.2% 41.9% 28,758 494,991
 West  55.8%  62.6%  1.1% 5.9% 43.1% 31.6% 13.9% 42.9% 23,185 407,077
 East  31.2%  35.3%  2.9% 6.3% 65.9% 58.4% 15.5% 37.5% 5,574 87,914
2004 Germany 51.0% 52.7%  1.0% 11.0% 48.1% 36.4% 8.9% 37.6% 29,903 512,595
 West  54.3%  57.3%  0.7% 7.7% 45.1% 35.0% 8.5% 37.1% 24,748 419,193
 East  35.1%  31.9%  2.6% 25.5% 62.4% 42.6% 10.6% 40.1% 5,155 93,402
2005 Germany 38.9% 42.4%  6.1% 12.8% 55.1% 44.8% 11.7% 33.7% 31,658 472,637
 West  42.9%  45.6%  6.8% 13.8% 50.3% 40.7% 12.4% 34.8% 26,819 393,365
 East  16.6%  26.4%  1.9% 8.0% 81.5% 65.6% 7.5% 28.2% 4,839 79,272
2006 Germany 41.6% 47.9%  3.6% 5.6% 54.8% 46.5% 11.9% 36.8% 26,590 427,300
 West  44.0%  49.6%  2.9% 4.5% 53.0% 45.8% 13.0% 37.5% 22,356 348,115
 East  28.6%  40.3%  7.4% 10.4% 64.0% 49.3% 6.2% 34.1% 4,234 79,185
2007 Germany 32.9% 38.6%  0.9% 6.6% 66.1% 54.8% 9.2% 29.8% 24,278 429,057
 West  37.4%  40.2%  0.6% 7.0% 62.0% 52.9% 10.4% 30.7% 19,549 353,197
 East  14.6%  31.2%  2.2% 5.0% 83.3% 63.8% 4.2% 25.6% 4,729 75,860
2008 Germany 23.5% 39.2%  2.3% 6.9% 74.2% 53.8% 7.8% 28.4% 28,381 405,561
 West  24.5%  39.4%  2.4% 6.8% 73.1% 53.7% 7.9% 28.1% 24,236 337,808
 East  17.4%  38.3%  1.9% 7.4% 80.7% 54.3% 6.9% 29.7% 4,144 67,753
        Note: Closing/failing establishments correspond to the sum of groups 6, 9, and 12 in Table 1. I denotes the                                













































sectoral agreement firm-level agreement no agreement works council
FIGURE 1 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-



























































































































sectoral agreement firm-level agreement no agreement works council
FIGURE 2 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Employment for Germany and by Broad Region, 2000-

























































































































sectoral agreement firm-level agreement no agreement works council
FIGURE 3 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment for Germany and by Broad Region, 
























































































































sectoral agreement firm-level agreement no agreement works council
FIGURE 4 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Employment for Germany and by Broad Region, 






































































































sectoral agreement firm-level agreement no agreement works council
FIGURE 5 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment and Employment in Newly-Founded 
Establishments (i.e. Births), Germany, 2000-2008 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
 





















































































sectoral agreement firm-level agreement no agreement works council
FIGURE 6 
Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage by Establishment and Employment Among Closing 
Establishments (i.e. Deaths), Germany, 2000-2008 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
 


















(b) Coverage by Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 